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2013 
Corporate Oversight and 
Disobedience 
Elizabeth Pollman* 
Over a decade has passed since landmark Delaware corporate law 
decisions on oversight responsibility, and only a small handful of cases have 
survived a motion to dismiss. Scholars have puzzled over what it means to 
have the potential for corporate accountability lodged within the duty of good 
faith, but almost never brought to fruition in terms of trial liability. 
This Article explores the public-regarding purpose of the obedience 
and oversight duties in corporate law and provides a descriptive account of 
how they are applied in practice. The Article argues that the fidelity to 
external law required by the duty of good faith largely serves a legitimizing 
role for corporate law. Expressing obligations of legal compliance and 
oversight within corporate law acknowledges societal interests in the rule of 
law and preserves the ability of courts to flexibly respond to particularly 
salient and egregious violations of public trust, should they arise, without 
upending case law developed over decades. 
Further, this Article examines the body of Delaware law concerning 
the oversight and obedience aspects of the duty of good faith and argues that 
they have become functionally linked. In practice to date, Delaware courts 
have prioritized giving directors broad latitude to take business risk by 
drawing a line at legal risk, despite the possibility that both types of activity 
could create social value or harm depending on the circumstances. Under 
current Delaware case law, courts have allowed Caremark claims to proceed 
where evidence exists to infer that the board utterly failed to implement a 
compliance monitoring system or that the directors engaged in disobedience by 
consciously flouting, violating, or ignoring the law. Bringing together these 
threads of discussion, this Article concludes that corporate law’s public-
regarding commitment to the rule of law supports accountability in these 
 
 * Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. For helpful comments and 
suggestions, thanks to participants in the symposium convened by the Vanderbilt Law Review 
and the Institute for Law and Economic Policy, and commentators Vice Chancellor Joseph 
Slights, Lisa Fairfax, and Salvatore Graziano. This Article also benefited from excellent 
comments from Hillary Sale and her corporate governance seminar at Georgetown Law, Ann 
Lipton, and participants at the National Business Law Scholars Conference 2019 at Berkeley 
Law. 
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instances of disobedience as well as more broadly when fiduciaries act with 
willful ignorance or an awareness that their efforts at compliance are 
insufficient. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the corporate law canon lies the promise of powerful 
accountability. Decades ago, the potential for the fiduciary duty of care 
to be the source of this accountability for corporate directors was lost. 
It was stripped of its sting just after its bite in Smith v. Van Gorkom.1 
Nearly as soon as the Delaware Supreme Court ruled in the 1985 case 
that the directors had acted with gross negligence in corporate 
decisionmaking, the state legislature enacted section 102(b)(7) of the 
General Corporation Law.2 The outcry from corporate America 
 
 1. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); see also William T. Allen, The Corporate Director’s Fiduciary 
Duty of Care and the Business Judgment Rule Under U.S. Law, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING RESEARCH 307, 324 (Klaus J. Hopt et al. 
eds., 1998) (“The long history that was inconsistent with courts directly imposing liability on 
corporate directors for violation of the objective standard of care was interrupted by the decision 
of the Delaware Supreme Court in Smith v. Van Gorkom.”); Henry Ridgely Horsey, The Duty of 
Care Component of the Delaware Business Judgment Rule, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 971, 977 (1994) 
(“[B]efore the mid-eighties . . . the business judgment rule had been applied in such a manner as 
to constitute an almost per se bar to shareholder claims of directors’ breach of their fiduciary 
duty of care.”). 
 2. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2019); E. Norman Veasey, Jesse A. Finkelstein & C. 
Stephen Bigler, Delaware Supports Directors with a Three-Legged Stool of Limited Liability, 
Indemnification, and Insurance, 42 BUS. LAW. 399, 401–04 (1987) (discussing the enactment of 
§ 102(b)(7) in 1986). 
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demanded this response—corporations were given the freedom to put 
exculpatory provisions in their charters eliminating the personal 
liability of directors for monetary damages for breach of the duty of 
care.3 Corporate directors could thereafter rest easy knowing that 
absent fraud, bad faith, or self-dealing, they would rarely, if ever, pay 
out of pocket for harming the corporation, even if their service had 
been far less than perfect.4 
But the potential for corporate accountability through fiduciary 
duty law was not entirely extinguished. Setting aside traditional duty 
of loyalty issues such as self-dealing, the duty of good faith remained 
as a potential mechanism for accountability that could not be 
exculpated. Two aspects of the duty of good faith—obedience and 
oversight—soon came into sharper focus through a series of cases that 
joined Smith v. Van Gorkom in the corporate law canon: In re 
Caremark International Inc.;5 In re Walt Disney Co.;6 and Stone v. 
Ritter.7  
Through these cases, the Delaware courts established a claim 
for what became known as Caremark liability, which involves an utter 
failure to implement an information and reporting system to allow the 
board to monitor the legal compliance of the corporation or a conscious 
failure to monitor its operations.8 A successful claim requires showing 
that “the directors knew that they were not discharging their fiduciary 
obligations”—that is, a “conscious disregard” of their oversight 
responsibilities, which implicates the duty of good faith.9 Further, the 
Delaware Supreme Court clarified that a breach of the duty of good 
faith can also be shown in any instance in which the fiduciary acts 
 
 3. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance 
Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 1160 (1990) (“A little over a year after the [D&O insurance] crisis 
began, Delaware enacted a statute permitting corporations to eliminate their directors’ liability 
for monetary damages for breaching their duty of care.”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Lawrence A. 
Hamermesh, R. Franklin Balotti & Jeffrey M. Gorris, Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role 
of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 660–61 (2010) (“Fear that verdicts like Van 
Gorkom could be common drove up directors and officers liability insurance costs and gave 
directors reason to be concerned about service. Section 102(b)(7) was the General Assembly’s 
answer to that problem.”). 
 4. See Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58 
STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1063–64 (2006) (finding that from 1980 to 2005 outside directors of public 
companies made out-of-pocket payments in only thirteen cases); Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Why I 
Do Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 GA. L. REV. 477, 490 (2000) (“Charter provision enabling statutes 
like Delaware’s section 102(b)(7), moreover, have been almost universally implemented by 
corporations to which such laws apply.”). 
 5. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 6. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
 7. 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). 
 8. Id. at 370. 
 9. Id. 
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with a purpose other than advancing the best interests of the 
corporation, intentionally disregards duties, or intends to violate 
positive law.10 As part of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, claims of bad 
faith cannot be exculpated.11 
Over a decade has passed since these landmark decisions, and 
with virtually no cases going to trial and resulting in liability, scholars 
have puzzled over whether Caremark oversight responsibility is a 
“practical irrelevance”12 or only “soft law.”13 And, despite a constant 
stream of media headlines exposing corporate illegality, shareholder 
suits successfully holding directors liable for breaking the law are 
extremely rare.14 This state of affairs raises the question of what it 
means to have the potential for corporate accountability lodged within 
the duty of good faith but almost never brought to fruition in terms of 
trial liability. 
This Article offers a two-fold answer to this question—a 
descriptive theory of the purpose of the obedience and oversight duties 
in corporate law, and a functional account of how they are applied in 
practice. First, this Article argues that the fidelity to external law 
required by the duty of good faith largely serves a legitimizing role for 
corporate law.15 Shareholders cannot be counted on to police corporate 
illegality, and oversight failures may rarely rise to the level of 
conscious disregard. The fiduciary duty of good faith is neither 
irrelevant nor toothless, however—it embeds a safety valve for public 
policy in the obligations of fiduciaries that cannot be eliminated. 
Expressing legal compliance and oversight obligations within 
corporate law acknowledges societal interests in the rule of law and 
preserves the ability of courts to flexibly respond to particularly 
 
 10. Id. at 369–70; In re Walt Disney Co., 906 A.2d at 67. 
 11. Stone, 911 A.2d at 367, 369–70. 
 12. Mercer Bullard, Caremark’s Irrelevance, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 15, 43 (2013); see also 
Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, In re Caremark: Good Intentions, Unintended 
Consequences, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 691, 692 (2004) (characterizing Caremark as “an empty 
triumph of form over substance”). 
 13. Claire A. Hill, Caremark as Soft Law, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 681, 682, 697 (2018) (arguing 
that Caremark has “considerable, albeit soft force”). 
 14. See Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Disobedience, 68 DUKE L.J. 709, 756 (2019) (“Despite 
widespread corporate illegality, there are few modern cases in which shareholders have 
successfully held directors liable for breaking the law.”); see also KENT GREENFIELD, THE 
FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 75 (2006) 
(“[T]here is not a single, modern case that holds directors liable to shareholders just because the 
directors or the corporation broke the law.”); Norwood P. Beveridge, Does the Corporate Director 
Have a Duty Always to Obey the Law?, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 729, 732 (1996) (“[T]here is no such 
thing as a corporation . . . in compliance with law; rather, there are only corporations (and 
businesses) out of compliance with law to varying degrees. Despite that fact, there are no modern 
cases holding directors liable to shareholders for breaking the law.”). 
 15. See infra Part II. 
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salient and egregious violations of public trust, should they arise, 
without upending case law developed over decades. 
Second, this Article examines the body of Delaware law 
concerning the oversight and obedience aspects of the duty of good 
faith and argues that they have become functionally linked.16 
Corporate law takes legal obedience as a strict requirement, and the 
Caremark doctrine creates a mandate for the board to put in place and 
monitor some system of compliance, but beyond this minimal 
threshold courts have not policed the effectiveness of oversight. 
Rather, the potential for oversight liability through fiduciary duty 
doctrine arises in the limited context of an utter failure to implement 
a board-level monitoring and reporting system or when fiduciaries 
flout, violate, or ignore laws with a level of scienter that rises to 
conscious disregard or intent. In practice, Delaware courts have 
prioritized giving directors broad latitude to take business risk by 
drawing a line at legal risk, despite the possibility that both types of 
activity could create social value or harm depending on the 
circumstances.17 Moreover, examining Delaware case law reveals that 
courts have stringently reviewed the pleadings for Caremark claims, 
requiring particularized factual allegations of conscious disregard that 
resembles intent to violate the law or acquiescence in misconduct. 
With limited exception, the handful of Delaware cases alleging 
Caremark claims that have survived motions to dismiss involved 
particularized allegations of a complete lack of board oversight or 
egregious disobedience—in circumstances in which the corporation 
was allegedly engaged in pervasive wrongdoing, when facts supported 
an inference that directors were complicit in fraudulent business 
models or deceiving regulators, and when rogue corporations 
expressed disagreement with underlying laws. 
Bringing together these threads of discussion, this Article’s 
analysis concludes with the observation that corporate law’s public-
regarding commitment to the rule of law supports accountability in 
these instances of disobedience as well as more broadly when 
fiduciaries act with willful ignorance or an awareness that their 
efforts at compliance are insufficient. Knowing action or inaction that 
does not further lawful business is inconsistent with the dictates of 
corporate law. Although derivative litigation is often an imperfect tool 
for corporate accountability and drawing a line between business and 
legal risk is debatable from a social welfare perspective, the doctrinal 
 
 16. See infra Section III.A. 
 17. See infra Section III.B. 
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foundations exist for a robust understanding of the obligations of 
oversight and obedience. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides background on 
the fiduciary duty doctrines of legal obedience and oversight. Part II 
looks to the content and structure of the duty of good faith, and 
specifically the obedience and oversight obligations, to evince a 
positive theory of the role of these obligations within corporate law. It 
argues that evolving statutory law and fiduciary duty jurisprudence 
have recognized that these obligations cannot be eliminated because 
they preserve a safety valve for protecting public policy, which springs 
from the same source as corporate charters—the state. The obedience 
and oversight aspects of the duty of good faith serve to legitimize 
corporate law. Part III provides a descriptive account of the doctrines 
in practice, showing that Caremark and its progeny set forth a 
minimum threshold for establishing and maintaining a compliance 
system at the board level, after which the possibility of liability arises 
once conduct enters a zone of disobedience. The Part concludes with 
observations about the implications of this doctrinal trend. 
I. OBEDIENCE AND OVERSIGHT 
State corporate law expresses fidelity to legal compliance 
through dual requirements of obedience and oversight. The obligation 
of obedience concerns the corporation itself, which must serve a 
“lawful purpose,” and its directors, who have fiduciary duties that 
prohibit them from acting with the intention of violating the law. The 
obligation of oversight concerns the monitoring function of the board 
of directors to ensure the legal compliance of actors within the 
corporation. This Part examines both of these obligations in turn, 
laying the groundwork for exploring their underlying purpose in 
theory and function in practice. 
A. The Longstanding Requirement of Legal Obedience 
An endless variety of businesses may organize through the 
corporate form, but as a matter of fundamental principles, they are all 
required to engage in only lawful conduct. Corporate statutes enshrine 
this prime directive of obedience.18 For example, section 101(b) of the 
Delaware General Corporation Law provides: “A corporation may be 
incorporated or organized under this chapter to conduct or promote 
 
 18. Strine et al., supra note 3, at 649. 
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any lawful business or purposes, except as may otherwise be provided 
by the Constitution or of the law of this State.”19 
As I have observed elsewhere, this statutory requirement “of 
lawful conduct can be understood in historical context and as a 
function of the basic fact that it is only through government-granted 
charters that corporations exist.”20 Until the mid-nineteenth century, 
state legislatures chartered corporations through special acts for 
specifically authorized activity.21 It logically follows from the 
government grant of a corporate charter that the provision of power 
was limited to the confines of state-imposed legal boundaries.22 
Further, when states adopted general incorporation statutes, the 
specification of a particular business purpose in the charter was 
liberalized, but the requirement of lawful conduct remained.23 And, 
although corporate statutes typically refer to the granting of charters 
for a lawful purpose, courts and commentators have generally 
interpreted this language to broadly refer to an ongoing obligation of 
lawful business operation.24 
Following this statutory requirement, longstanding judicial 
practice dictates that deference is not accorded to fiduciaries who 
 
 19. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2019). 
 20. Pollman, supra note 14, at 719. 
 21. JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970, 14–17 (1970); Robert B. Thompson, Why New Corporate Law 
Arises: Implications for the Twenty-First Century, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING 
TIMES: IS THE LAW KEEPING UP? 3, 5–6 (Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall Stuart Thomas eds., 
2019). 
 22. See Gregory A. Mark, Comment, The Personification of the Business Corporation in 
American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1452 (1987) (“That a corporation derived its powers from 
the sovereign was inherent in the contractual conception of the grant theory. The government 
granted nothing unless it agreed to the objects of the proposed corporation.”). 
 23. See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Statutory Developments in Business Corporation Law, 1886-
1936, 50 HARV. L. REV. 27, 29 (1936):  
Financial institutions and railroads were generally regarded as requiring special 
treatment, but the earlier manufacturing corporation acts tended to evolve, either by 
the inclusion of other types of corporations or by the insertion of a provision for the 
formation of corporations for any lawful purpose other than those specifically 
excepted, into substantially what we know today as business corporation acts. 
On the topic of illegality and the ultra vires doctrine, see Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A 
Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (With Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce 
International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1314 (2001) (“During the height of the ultra 
vires doctrine, a corporation’s illegal activities were considered a subset of the larger category of 
ultra vires activities. In no sense were corporations considered as having the authority to 
perform illegal activities, even when performed to advance the interest of the firm.”); and Alan R. 
Palmiter, Duty of Obedience: The Forgotten Duty, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 460 (2011) (“[T]he 
original ultra vires doctrine not only set the boundaries of corporate power as established by 
corporate norms, it also recognized that the corporation is powerless to violate non-corporate 
norms—that is, external law.”). 
 24. Pollman, supra note 14, at 721. 
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direct the corporation to violate the law. As a doctrinal matter, over a 
century of case law provides that corporate directors and officers who 
engage in unlawful conduct on behalf of the corporation do not receive 
business judgment rule protection.25 Courts have explained that “a 
fiduciary may not choose to manage an entity in an illegal fashion, 
even if the fiduciary believes that the illegal activity will result in 
profits for the entity.”26 
In 2006, in the landmark case of In re Walt Disney Co., the 
Delaware Supreme Court clarified how this deep-rooted requirement 
of legal obedience fits within the framework of fiduciary duties.27 
Plaintiff shareholders in the derivative suit challenged an 
“unfortunate hiring decision at Disney”28 that had resulted in a $130 
million severance package paid to a senior executive upon his 
termination after little more than a year of work at the company.29 As 
the Disney charter had a director exculpation provision pursuant to 
section 102(b)(7), any liability for the breach of the duty of care was 
foreclosed. This left only claims of waste—easily disposed of by the 
court—and breach of the duty of good faith, since no traditional duty 
of loyalty issue was implicated in the context of independent 
decisionmaking.30 Acknowledging the duty to act in good faith had 
played a prominent role in the plaintiff-shareholders’ case and was an 
area of corporate fiduciary law “up to this point relatively uncharted,” 
the court took the opportunity to provide “conceptual guidance to the 
corporate community.”31 It explained: 
 
 25. See, e.g., Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1974) (holding that shareholders 
had stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty arising from the alleged violation of federal 
campaign finance law and noting the business judgment rule “cannot insulate the defendant 
directors from liability if they did in fact breach [a statutory prohibition], as plaintiffs have 
charged”); Roth v. Robertson, 118 N.Y.S. 351, 354 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1909) (sustaining recovery from 
a director who used corporate funds to bribe individuals who had threatened to complain about 
the corporation operating in violation of the state’s Sunday closing laws). 
 26. Metro Commc’n Corp. BVI v. Advanced Mobilecomm Techs. Inc., 854 A.2d 121, 131 (Del. 
Ch. 2004); see also Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“[O]ne cannot act 
loyally as a corporate director by causing the corporation to violate the positive laws it is obliged 
to obey.”). 
 27. 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). For a tracing of the historical shift from treating obedience as 
an issue of corporate power to fiduciary duty related to “compliance with noncorporate legal 
norms,” see Palmiter, supra note 23, at 462–64, 474. 
 28. In re Walt Disney Co., 906 A.2d at 36. 
 29. Id. at 35. 
 30. See Strine et al., supra note 3, at 692:  
Prevented from arguing a breach of the duty of care, . . . plaintiffs’ lawyers saw 
an opportunity to reframe the debate and argue that the independent directors 
had approved a transaction in bad faith, and to push judges to treat directorial 
behavior that appeared to be less adroit and diligent than was reasonable as 
indicative of bad faith. 
 31. In re Walt Disney Co., 906 A.2d at 64. 
     
2019] CORPORATE OVERSIGHT AND DISOBEDIENCE 2021 
[T]he universe of fiduciary misconduct is not limited to either disloyalty in the classic 
sense (i.e., preferring the adverse self-interest of the fiduciary or of a related person to 
the interest of the corporation) or gross negligence. Cases have arisen where corporate 
directors have no conflicting self-interest in a decision, yet engage in misconduct that is 
more culpable than simple inattention or failure to be informed of all facts material to 
the decision. To protect the interests of the corporation and its shareholders, fiduciary 
conduct of this kind, which does not involve disloyalty (as traditionally defined) but is 
qualitatively more culpable than gross negligence, should be proscribed. A vehicle is 
needed to address such violations doctrinally, and that doctrinal vehicle is the duty to 
act in good faith.32 
Further, the court clarified that a fiduciary could breach the 
duty to act in good faith in a variety of ways, including through acts of 
legal disobedience: 
A failure to act in good faith may be shown, for instance, where the fiduciary 
intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of the 
corporation, where the fiduciary acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law, 
or where the fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, 
demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties.33  
After In re Walt Disney Co., acting with intent to violate the 
law was clearly proscribed as a breach of the duty of good faith, 
stamped with the moral judgment of being more culpable than gross 
negligence and out of bounds for exculpation.34 In sum, as a matter of 
Delaware corporate law, both the statute and case law from the 
highest arbiter have required legal obedience, without qualification or 
exceptions, as an “essential bottom-line requirement.”35 
B. Oversight and Compliance Responsibility in Fiduciary Law 
Moving to a relatively more modern area of doctrinal 
development, the starting point for tracing the evolution of Delaware’s 
oversight jurisprudence is, by common practice, the 1963 case Graham 
v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.36 The derivative action alleged 
that the directors of Allis-Chalmers had breached their fiduciary 
duties by failing to prevent violations of federal antitrust laws by the 
corporation’s employees.37 The Delaware Supreme Court found no 
liability on the facts, holding that “absent cause for suspicion there is 
no duty upon the directors to install and operate a corporate system of 
 
 32. Id. at 66. 
 33. Id. at 67. 
 34. See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 
UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1997) (describing Delaware judicial opinions that describe legal 
standards of conduct as “corporate law sermons”). 
 35. Strine et al., supra note 3, at 649–50. 
 36. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963). 
37.  Id. at 127. 
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espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to 
suspect exists.”38 
Three decades later, the Delaware Court of Chancery 
reassessed this precedent in the case that became synonymous with 
oversight responsibility: In re Caremark International Inc.39 The story 
began in 1994 when the federal government indicted Caremark for 
violating the Anti-Referral Payments Law, a statute prohibiting 
healthcare businesses from paying doctors and other providers for 
referring Medicare or Medicaid patients.40 By mid-1995, Caremark 
settled the federal litigation by pleading guilty to mail fraud, paying 
criminal fines, and entering into a monetary settlement for civil 
claims.41 Together with settlement payments for related private party 
litigation, the company paid $250 million in total to resolve the claims 
regarding its improper business practices.42 
Subsequently, Caremark shareholders brought derivative suits 
against the board, seeking to hold the members individually liable for 
the losses suffered by the corporation.43 The suits ended in a 
settlement agreement, which provided for no monetary liability but 
created a plan designed to ensure legal compliance going forward.44 
All that was before the Delaware Court of Chancery in 1996 was 
judicial approval of the settlement, which was deemed fair and 
reasonable to the class. Chancellor William Allen did not let the 
moment pass unnoticed, however, and seeded into the opinion’s dicta 
the notion that an altogether different claim than negligent 
decisionmaking had been at stake. Invoking Graham, the opinion 
observed evolving regulatory trends at the time, such as the 
increasing use of criminal sanctions in federal law to ensure corporate 
compliance and the mitigation of sanctions under federal criminal 
sentencing guidelines for corporate defendants that had compliance 
programs in place.45 In light of these developments, the court noted it 
could no longer interpret Graham in a way that suggested a board has 
no affirmative obligation to put some information and reporting 
system in place to monitor legal compliance.46 Consequently, the court 
explained that in carrying out their oversight responsibility, the 
 
 38. Id. at 130. 
 39. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 40. Id. at 961–63. 
 41. Id. at 960–61. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See id. at 964. 
 44. Id. at 966. 
 45. Id. at 969–70. 
46. Id. at 970. 
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directors had “a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a 
corporate information and reporting system, which the board 
concludes is adequate, exists and that failure to do so under some 
circumstances may, in theory at least, render a director liable for 
losses caused by noncompliance with applicable legal standards.”47 
Commenting that this basis for oversight liability “is possibly 
the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff 
might hope to win judgment,”48 the court opined that  
plaintiffs would have to show either (1) that the directors knew or (2) should have 
known that violations of law were occurring and, in either event, (3) that the directors 
took no steps in a good faith effort to prevent or remedy that situation, and (4) that such 
failure proximately resulted in the losses complained of.49  
Chancellor Allen concluded on the record before him that there was 
“essentially no evidence” of a violation—the facts did “not support the 
conclusion that the defendants either lacked good faith in the exercise 
of their monitoring responsibilities or conscientiously permitted a 
known violation of law . . . to occur.”50 
The landmark case gave rise to the notion under corporate law 
of a “Caremark claim”—alleging breach of fiduciary duty for failure to 
provide board oversight. And a decade later, in 2006, a pair of cases 
came before the Delaware Supreme Court that affirmed the validity of 
a Caremark claim, gave meaning to the fiduciary duty of good faith, 
and cabined it within the fiduciary duty of loyalty, which cannot be 
exculpated. First, as discussed above, In re Walt Disney Co. elucidated 
a variety of ways in which a fiduciary could breach the duty to act in 
good faith—notably including not only acting with an intent to violate 
positive law, but also acting with a purpose other than that of 
advancing the best interests of the corporation or with a conscious 
disregard of duties.51 Second, in Stone v. Ritter, an oversight case 
involving “a classic Caremark claim”52 in which a bank corporation 
paid $50 million in fines and penalties for violations of federal anti-
money laundering regulations, the court explained that the previous 
articulation of director oversight liability was valid and required a 
showing of scienter constituting bad faith.53   
 
 47. Id. 
 48.  Id. at 967. 
 49. Id. at 971. 
 50. Id. at 971–72; see also Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good Faith, 32 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 719 (2007) (discussing the Caremark opinion and its implications for the development of 
corporate law and governance). 
 51. 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006). 
 52. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 364 (Del. 2006). 
53.  Id. at 370–73. 
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Specifically, the Stone court held that “the necessary conditions 
predicate for director oversight liability” include showing either “(a) 
the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or information 
system or controls; or (b) having implemented such a system or 
controls, consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus 
disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems 
requiring their attention.”54 Further, “[i]n either case, imposition of 
liability requires a showing that the directors knew that they were not 
discharging their fiduciary obligations.”55 Such a showing of “conscious 
disregard” for discharging fiduciary obligations in good faith amounts 
to a breach of the duty of loyalty.56 
Notably, the case law has developed in the context of 
settlement opinions and motions to dismiss. As in Graham and 
Caremark, the Stone court found that despite significant financial loss 
to the corporation for the violation of criminal laws by employees, the 
plaintiffs had failed to plead demand futility with regard to their 
oversight claim against the directors.57 According to the court, the 
plaintiffs sought “to equate a bad outcome with bad faith” without 
recognizing that “good faith exercise of oversight responsibility may 
not invariably prevent employees from violating criminal laws, or from 
causing the corporation to incur significant financial liability, or 
both.”58 Critically, “[i]n the absence of red flags, good faith in the 
context of oversight must be measured by the directors’ actions ‘to 
assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists’ and not 
by second-guessing after the occurrence of employee conduct that 
results in an unintended adverse outcome.”59 
A small number of cases involving Caremark claims have 
survived motions to dismiss. In Marchand v. Barnhill, for example, 
the Delaware Supreme Court applied the standard articulated in 
Stone and found that the plaintiffs had successfully pled 
particularized facts to support a claim that the board of ice cream 
manufacturer Blue Bell Creameries “failed to implement any system 
to monitor Blue Bell’s food safety performance or compliance.”60 In 
 
 54. Id. at 370 (emphasis in original). 
 55. Id. For an argument that the convergence of good faith and oversight was “one of those 
unfortunate marriages that leaves both sides worse off,” see Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., The 
Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559, 605 (2008). 
 56. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370. 
 57. Id. at 373. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. (quoting In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 
1996)). 
 60. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 809 (Del. 2019). 
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that case, the company suffered a listeria outbreak that killed three 
people and caused the company to recall all its products, shut down 
production, lay off a significant portion of its workforce, and accept a 
dilutive private equity financing.61 As the ice cream manufacturer 
makes only a single product, the court noted that food safety is a 
central compliance issue for the company and the complaint therefore 
created a reasonable inference that the “dearth of any board-level 
effort at monitoring” was a conscious failure.62 Although few cases 
have met the stringent standard applied at the motion to dismiss 
stage, the Delaware courts have consistently recognized the potential 
validity of claims against directors based on oversight failures. 
II. A POSITIVE ACCOUNT OF THE LEGITIMIZING ROLE OF THE  
DUTY OF GOOD FAITH 
With this groundwork set, we can now turn to a deeper 
question: What is the purpose of these dual requirements of obedience 
and oversight? Delaware law is largely enabling—it has, “for the most 
part, chosen to let corporations decide what constraints, if any, they 
should impose on their fiduciaries.”63 Corporations can eliminate 
monetary damages for directors stemming from a breach of the duty of 
care and can carve out significant aspects of the duty of loyalty 
through waivers of corporate opportunity doctrine.64 Yet a certain core 
of fiduciary duty remains mandatory, beyond the reach of private 
ordering, and at the heart of this is the elusive duty of good faith, 
which contains both obedience and oversight responsibility. 
Scholars have offered wide-ranging accounts of the content and 
structure of the duty of good faith,65 its scienter-like nature,66 its 
 
 61. Id. at 807. 
 62. Id. at 809. 
 63. Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 462 (2004). 
 64. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(b)(7), 122(17) (2019); see also Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric 
Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate 
Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075 (2017) (finding that over one thousand public 
corporations have adopted corporate opportunity waivers). 
 65. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 1, 1–2 (2006) (describing the substantive content of the duty of good faith and arguing 
the duty is normatively desirable); Andrew S. Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate 
Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 457, 462 (2009) (discussing “the new fiduciary duty of loyalty” post-
Stone v. Ritter that includes the duty of good faith); Robert B. Thompson, The Short, But 
Interesting Life of Good Faith as an Independent Liability Rule, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 543, 544 
(2010) (examining explanations for “the rise of good faith”); Julian Velasco, How Many Fiduciary 
Duties Are There in Corporate Law?, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1234–35 (2010) (identifying “five 
different paradigms for the enforcement of fiduciary duties,” including good faith, which signifies 
“misconduct”). 
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rhetorical value,67 and its shortcomings.68 But little literature has 
highlighted that its obedience and oversight obligations serve a public 
function.69 The requirement of fidelity to the law aims to protect 
society’s interests, not those of the corporation.70 
This point can be evinced, as a positive matter, by the fact that 
directors may not, consistent with their fiduciary obligations, choose 
to violate the law, even if they intend to benefit the corporation or its 
shareholders in doing so. Delaware courts reflect this understanding, 
noting that “the fiduciary duty of loyalty is not limited to cases 
involving a financial or other cognizable fiduciary conflict of 
interest.”71 Fiduciaries may violate the duty of loyalty even when they 
pursue profits for the corporation and are not acting out of self-
interest. In Guttman v. Huang, the chancery court explained:  
The General Assembly could contribute usefully to ending the balkanization of the duty 
of loyalty by rewriting § 102(b)(7) to make clear that its subparts all illustrate conduct 
that is disloyal. For example, one cannot act loyally as a corporate director by causing 
the corporation to violate the positive laws it is obliged to obey.72 
 
 66. See Strine et al., supra note 3, at 644 (describing good faith as “the state of mind 
required of a loyal fiduciary exercising corporate powers”). 
 67. See Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate 
Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 34 (2005) (“[C]ourts applying the good faith standard do not 
confine themselves to the analytics of either traditional fiduciary duty. Instead, good faith is 
used as a loose rhetorical device that courts can wield to find liability or enjoin actions that do 
not quite fit within established doctrinal categories.”). 
 68. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Nowicki, Not in Good Faith, 60 SMU L. REV. 441, 491 (2007) 
(arguing that an “exacting definition of the phrase ‘not in good faith,’ ” which describes non-
exculpable conduct by directors, “is needed to ensure directors are held accountable”); Sale, supra 
note 63, at 482–94 (offering suggestions for the role of good faith and its application to corporate 
fiduciaries). 
 69. Notable works to do so include Hillary A. Sale, Fiduciary Law, Good Faith and 
Publicness, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 763 (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller & 
Robert H. Sitkoff eds., 2018) (discussing the relationship between the duty of good faith, the rule 
of law, and publicness); Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933, 
939 (2017) (observing that the government’s interest in compliance is not mainly to reduce 
agency costs, but rather to push corporations toward “accepting public-regarding 
responsibilities”); and Pollman, supra note 14, at 749–50 (“The statutory dictate serves not only 
this expressive function, but it also, quite notably, embeds society’s interests into corporate 
law . . . .”). 
 70. Pollman, supra note 14, at 717; see also PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01(b) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 1992) (“Even if 
corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced, the corporation, in the conduct 
of its business: (1) Is obliged, to the same extent as a natural person, to act within the 
boundaries set by law . . . .”). 
 71. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). 
 72. Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003); see Palmiter, supra note 23, 
at 458–59 (arguing for the revival of a separate fiduciary duty of obedience to “resolve much of 
the confusion engendered by the ‘duty of good faith’ ” and serve as a “reminder of the 
corporation’s exogenous effects”); see also Gold, supra note 65, at 477 (noting “the loyalty 
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The mode of analysis that courts apply to issues of obedience 
and oversight also reflects an understanding that fidelity to the law is 
nonnegotiable and is a requirement that aims to protect a public 
realm to which corporate law must subscribe, rather than to protect 
shareholders from agency costs.73 Case law focuses on public law 
obligations.74 Courts not only refrain from applying business judgment 
rule protection when the issue at stake involves a potential legal 
violation—they also do not engage in entire fairness analysis, which 
would look to the fiduciary’s treatment of the corporation, as that is 
not the relevant inquiry.75 Instead, the doctrine of good faith inquires 
into the intent or conscious disregard of the director in making 
decisions concerning legality or the monitoring of unlawful conduct 
within the corporation.76   
Further, to the extent that fidelity to the law is imposed not 
only through the corporate statute but also through fiduciary law, it 
must be lodged in a nonexculpable duty if it is to provide legitimacy 
and preserve the ability of courts to act in the face of egregious 
violations. This is the path that the legislature took in section 
102(b)(7) by carving out “acts or omissions not in good faith or which 
involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law” and the 
Delaware Supreme Court followed in In re Walt Disney Co. and 
Stone—to do otherwise would undermine the utility of good faith to 
 
implications of a director’s duty to comply with positive law are closely tied to the loyalty 
implications of a director’s intentional failure to perform known duties”). 
 73. Some aspects of the fiduciary duty of good faith may serve to combat agency costs, such 
as the use of appropriate and adequate monitoring systems which may constrain management 
from engaging in legal violations for self-serving purposes. See Donald C. Langevoort, Caremark 
and Compliance: A Twenty-Year Lookback, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 727, 739–40 (2018) (examining how 
selection, promotion, and compensation decisions can influence corporate culture and risk-
taking); Sale, supra note 50, at 752 (discussing good faith and agency costs). The point here is 
that the aspect of good faith that is focused on legal compliance also, or perhaps primarily, serves 
a public purpose and legitimizing role for corporate law, as can be seen from the fact that 
corporate law does not tolerate illegality even when it would be profit maximizing for 
corporations. 
 74. See Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1907, 1965–66 (2013) (“The case law articulating the ‘duty to legality’ seems to focus on 
public law obligations such as campaign finance laws, bribery, price fixing, mine safety 
regulations, off-label marketing of prescription drugs, and unfair labor practices.” (footnotes 
omitted)); see also Frank Partnoy, Corporations and Human Life, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 399, 418 
(2017) (“[T]he focus of risk management oversight is often on considerations of regulatory 
violations and tort liability.”). 
 75. See Eisenberg, supra note 65, at 29 (arguing that “limiting rules [such as the business 
judgment rule and entire fairness] should be and are inapplicable to conduct that violates the 
duty of good faith, because of the high degree of wrongfulness that such conduct involves”). 
 76. For an argument that mental-state inquiry such as the corporate law doctrine of good 
faith is the best way to identify evasive actors, see Samuel W. Buell, Good Faith and Law 
Evasion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 611 (2011). 
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serve as a safety valve in the interest of public policy.77 In this 
interpretation, the obligations of obedience and oversight are 
mandatory not because they would likely be the subject of bargaining 
failure or divergence between the interests of shareholders and 
managers but because they allow corporate law to reflect public values 
and police extreme cases at the margins.78 
Taking this observation a step further, by requiring legal 
obedience of the corporation and its directors, both in their 
decisionmaking capacity and in their role in establishing and 
maintaining an information and reporting system for compliance, we 
could view corporate law as acknowledging that ultimately 
corporations exist by grace of the state and an implicit social contract 
that protects public policy. Arguably, a clear way to reflect respect for 
this bargain underpinning corporate law is to affirm allegiance to the 
rule of law without second-guessing the merits of external laws or 
allowing for exceptions motivated by profit. Lodging these expressions 
within the duty of good faith amplifies the foundational statutory 
requirement of lawful conduct and allows for judicial review.79 
Corporations produce a continual flow of externalities; embedding a 
 
 77. Then-Vice Chancellor Leo E. Strine, Jr. charted this path in Guttman v. Huang by 
characterizing Caremark as implicating the duty of loyalty instead of care. Guttman, 823 A.2d at 
506 n.34 (“It does no service to our law’s clarity to continue to separate the duty of loyalty from 
its own essence; nor does the recognition that good faith is essential to loyalty demean or 
subordinate that essential requirement.”); see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise 
Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967, 975 (2009) (“In Guttman, however, Vice Chancellor Strine 
ripped the Caremark claim from its original home in the duty of care and reinvented it as a duty 
of loyalty . . . .”); see also Eisenberg, supra note 65, at 12–21 (critiquing Strine’s dyadic approach 
to fiduciary duties). 
 78. This view potentially supplements other explanations for why some fiduciary 
obligations remain mandatory in corporate law. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure 
of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1462 (1989) (arguing that fiduciary duties should 
be mandatory at the core given the limits of bargaining, the potential for divergence between the 
interests of shareholders and managers, and because variations may not be accurately priced); 
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1554 
(1989) (arguing “the mixed system of optional and mandatory legal rules that we observe may be 
best even from an essentially contractarian perspective”); see also Brian Broughman, Elizabeth 
Pollman & D. Gordon Smith, Fiduciary Law and the Preservation of Trust in Business 
Relationships, in FIDUCIARIES AND TRUST: ETHICS, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND LAW (Paul B. 
Miller & Matthew Harding eds., forthcoming 2020) (arguing that mandatory fiduciary duties 
enable the preservation of trust in business relationships). 
 79. See Buell, supra note 76, at 653 (“Stone and Lyondell, and their embrace of Caremark, 
are a choice by the Delaware courts to make clear that good faith is not a duty but an ancillary 
tool that fortifies background law.”). Delaware courts have acknowledged their public role. See, 
e.g., Steinberg v. Bryant, No. 2017-0736-SG, 2017 WL 6054943, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 7, 2017) 
(“The Court of Chancery, like any public court, ‘serves not only the litigants before it; it has a 
public function as well.’ ” (quoting Al Jazeera Am., LLC v. AT&T Servs., Inc., No. 8823-VCG, 
2013 WL 5614284, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 14, 2013)). 
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duty of obedience to laws and regulations that constrain these 
externalities for the good of society helps to legitimize corporate law. 
Along these lines, fidelity to the law has been the subject of a 
number of “corporate law sermons,”80 proclaiming corporate law’s 
dedication to the rule of law. For example, in Desimone v. Barrows, 
the Delaware Court of Chancery explained: 
[B]y consciously causing the corporation to violate the law, a director would be disloyal 
to the corporation and could be forced to answer for the harm he has caused. Although 
directors have wide authority to take lawful action on behalf of the corporation, they 
have no authority knowingly to cause the corporation to become a rogue, exposing the 
corporation to penalties from criminal and civil regulators.81 
Similarly, In re Massey Energy Co. includes the following 
passage: 
Delaware law does not charter law breakers. Delaware law allows corporations to 
pursue diverse means to make a profit, subject to a critical statutory floor, which is the 
requirement that Delaware corporations only pursue “lawful business” by “lawful 
acts.” As a result, a fiduciary of a Delaware corporation cannot be loyal to a Delaware 
corporation by knowingly causing it to seek profit by violating the law.82 
Further, the court invokes the role of the strict parent who will 
not tolerate a teenager’s excuse for youthful shenanigans and trouble 
with the law: 
Telling your parents that all the kids are getting caught shoplifting, cheating, or 
imbibing illegal substances is not, fortunately, a good excuse. For fiduciaries of 
Delaware corporations, there is no room to flout the law governing the corporation’s 
affairs. If the fiduciaries of a Delaware corporation do not like the applicable law, they 
can lobby to get it changed. But until it is changed, they must act in good faith to ensure 
that the corporation tries to comply with its legal duties.83 
Caremark itself can be viewed as a “seminal ‘message’ opinion,” 
catalyzing lawyers to advise corporate clients to put in place 
compliance systems and be mindful of oversight obligations.84 In all, 
 
 80. See Rock, supra note 34, at 1013–16 (describing how “Delaware courts provide a 
supplemental source of gossip, criticism, and sanction for this set of actors who are beyond the 
reach of the firm’s normal systems of social control”). 
 81. Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 934 (Del. Ch. 2007). Notably, while serving on the 
Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court, Leo E. Strine, Jr. has been particularly 
vocal in expressing the importance of fidelity to the law and has played an influential role in 
shaping this understanding of a public-regarding corporate law. 
 82. In re Massey Energy Co. No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479, at *20 (Del. Ch. May 31, 
2011) (footnote omitted). 
 83. Id. at *21 (footnote omitted). 
 84. Langevoort, supra note 73, at 729 (citing John H. Walsh, A History of Compliance, in 
MODERN COMPLIANCE: BEST PRACTICES FOR SECURITIES & FINANCE 5, 30 (David H. Lui & John 
H. Walsh eds., 2015)) (discussing lawyers’ advice to boards after Caremark); see also Stavros 
Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, The Hidden Power of Compliance, 103 MINN. L. REV. 2135, 2139 
(2019) (arguing that “legal and compliance officers have great power because they can alter 
board members’ incentives, and ensure that board members become aware of information they 
might prefer to ignore”). 
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this moralizing and messaging underscores an awareness of the 
legitimizing role that obedience and oversight serve within corporate 
law. 
To the extent that corporations do not display minimal respect 
for the law and compliance failures become salient, we could expect 
public pushback85 and the threat of further federalization of corporate 
law.86 The good faith obligations of obedience and oversight thus serve 
the expressive purpose of reinforcing the legitimacy of corporate law 
and also preserve its ability to react—a failsafe for egregious 
violations,87 rather than an effective and fine-tuned mechanism for the 
bulk of instances, which are left for other regulators and enforcers.88 
Providing a failsafe within the structure of corporate law allows for 
flexible adaptation when needed, rather than upending the entire 
system when a major controversy demands an unprecedented 
response.89 
 
 85. See Langevoort, supra note 73, at 741–42 (“The Chancellor knew that if boards failed to 
become more sophisticated and sensitive to doing [compliance] well—the cultural part as well as 
the policies and procedures—external pressures would continue to grow without regard to cost or 
efficiency.”); see also Hill, supra note 13, at 695 (arguing that “a profit-maximizing firm will have 
to consider not only what law requires but also what reputation requires,” which may 
“increasingly come to include corporate social responsibility”); Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. 
Thompson, ‘‘Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. 
L.J. 337, 341 (2013) (arguing “that, to a greater extent than generally acknowledged, the broader 
demands of publicness drive the creation of contemporary securities regulation”); Palmiter, supra 
note 23, at 475 (“The corporation, as distrusted as ever, would lose its social standing if it openly 
declared itself to be an unrepentant sociopath.”); Hillary A. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2011, at 137, 138 (describing the influence of government and the 
media on corporations and their “changing obligations”). 
 86. See Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 
29 J. CORP. L. 625, 625 (2004) (arguing that “a realistic threat of federalization is necessary to 
ensure the robust development of corporate law at the state level”); Marcel Kahan & Edward 
Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1576 
(2005) (arguing that “the possibility of federal preemption constitutes a threat to Delaware, but 
this threat is significant only in times—such as during the recent corporate scandals—when 
systemic change is seen as generating a significant populist payoff”); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s 
Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 644–46 (2003) (“What remains with the states is the 
corporate law that the federal players tolerate, and what gets reversed is that which they do 
not.”). For an argument that the standard of liability for compliance oversight failures is too lax 
and directors should be subject to a clawback of stock-based pay, see John Armour, Jeffrey N. 
Gordon & Geeyoung Min, Taking Compliance Seriously (Columbia Law and Econ., Working 
Paper No. 588, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3244167 
[https://perma.cc/XYU4-JS3P]. 
 87. See Strine et al., supra note 3, at 634 (“[W]e acknowledge that the duty of loyalty 
remains, as it always has, most difficult to apply to circumstances when directors act without an 
apparent selfish interest to injure the corporation. We also acknowledge that it is in that context 
that the concept of good faith has its greatest utility.”). 
 88. Pollman, supra note 14, at 751–57 (explaining why shareholder litigation cannot be 
relied on to police corporate disobedience). 
 89. Good faith in contract law also serves this policy objective of allowing a judge to invoke 
the doctrine “to do justice and do it according to law.” See Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in 
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III. THE DOCTRINAL CONVERGENCE OF CAREMARK  
CLAIMS AND DISOBEDIENCE 
Obedience and oversight obligations are not only linked 
conceptually through expressions of fidelity to the law and as part of 
the safety valve that good faith provides within corporate law, but are 
also connected in practice through the standard that has evolved for 
Caremark liability. This Part turns to an examination of this case law. 
At the time of this writing, approximately one hundred 
Delaware cases have cited the 1996 landmark Caremark opinion. 
Oversight liability after a trial on the merits is extremely rare.90 
Instead, the case law has developed through settlement opinions and 
motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and the pre-suit demand 
requirement of Rule 23.1, with few claims surviving such motions.91 
Examining these cases reveals that oversight has evolved in 
application to require a showing that borders on, or includes, utter 
failure or disobedience. 
As the first part of the discussion below explores, a board can 
immunize itself from liability under the first prong of Caremark by 
simply demonstrating that it has put in place some system of 
compliance that is monitored at the board level. And, as the second 
part of the discussion demonstrates, successful pleading of the second 
Caremark prong has in practice involved particularized factual 
assertions that suggest board-level participation in illegality or 
improper managing of legal risk. Through these cases, courts have 
drawn a line between the oversight of business risk and legal risk—
the former given wide allowance and the latter deemed improper. In 
 
General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 
195, 198–99 (1968) (“Without legal resources of this general nature [a judge] might, in a 
particular case, be unable to do justice at all, or he might be able to do it only at the cost of 
fictionalizing existing legal concepts and rules, thereby snarling up the law for future cases.”). 
 90. In a post-trial opinion in ATR-Kim Eng Financial Corp. v. Araneta, the Delaware Court 
of Chancery found that two directors breached their duty of loyalty by failing to monitor the 
controlling shareholder and board chair’s self-dealing and by being “complicit[ ] in his wrongful 
endeavors.” No. CIV-A. 489-N, 2006 WL 3783520, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2006). 
 91. If one looks to jurisdictions outside of Delaware applying the Caremark standard, the 
universe of cases that survived motions to dismiss expands significantly. See, e.g., In re Abbott 
Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2003); McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808 (6th 
Cir. 2001), amended on denial of reh’g, 250 F.3d 997 (6th Cir. 2001); In re Wells Fargo & Co. 
S’holder Derivative Litig., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1074 (N.D. Cal. 2017); In re Intuitive Surgical 
S’holder Derivative Litig., 146 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2015); In re Pfizer Inc. S’holder 
Derivative Litig., 722 F. Supp. 2d 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Biopure Corp. Derivative Litig., 424 
F. Supp. 2d 305 (D. Mass. 2006). Plaintiffs might expect more favorable outcomes in non-
Delaware venues, but at least some are limited by charter and bylaw provisions that require 
derivative claims to be brought in Delaware courts. See Langevoort, supra note 73, at 735 n.39 
(citing Verity Winship, Shareholder Litigation by Contract, 96 B.U. L. REV. 485 (2016)). 
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this way, Caremark has largely been cabined to the most extreme 
cases involving legal violations. This evolution is consistent with 
corporate law’s focus on establishing legitimacy through affirmations 
of legal obedience, but it is often anemic in application and lacks 
tailoring to the potential for social value and harm that corporations 
produce for shareholders and stakeholders through business and legal 
risk. The third part of the discussion concludes with additional 
observations about the implications of this doctrinal trend and the 
potential for a more capacious approach to oversight claims. 
A. The Common Path of Dismissal 
Since Caremark, “compliance has grown in size, scope, and 
stature at nearly all large corporations.”92 The rise of corporate 
compliance systems has been accompanied by a parade of shareholder 
litigation defeated at the motion to dismiss stage. Two Delaware cases 
illustrate the typical dynamic of directors who fail to provide effective 
oversight but succeed in defending against suit: In re Citigroup Inc.93 
and In re General Motors Co.94 
The first of these cases takes us back to the era of the 2008 
financial crisis. Citigroup had approximately $55 billion in exposure to 
the subprime mortgage market via collateralized debt obligations and 
other investments.95 When the market collapsed, Citigroup suffered 
serious financial losses and shareholder litigation followed, claiming 
that the director defendants were liable under Caremark for failing to 
adequately implement and oversee an information and reporting 
system regarding the company’s exposure to the subprime mortgage 
market.96 As corporate law scholars James Cox and Randall Thomas 
explained in their examination of the case,  
The suit alleged ample red flags that should have caught the board’s eye, such as an 
economist’s forecast that a speculative bubble was nearing its end, a leading subprime 
lender closing its 229 offices, another lender filing bankruptcy, analysts downgrading 
 
 92. Langevoort, supra note 73, at 728. The burgeoning literature on compliance includes: 
Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949 (2009); Sean J. 
Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075 (2016); 
Langevoort, supra note 69; William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the 
Paradox of Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1343 (1999); Veronica Root, The Monitor-“Client” 
Relationship, 100 VA. L. REV. 523 (2014). 
 93. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 113 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 94. In re Gen. Motors Co. Derivative Litig., No. 9627-VCG, 2015 WL 3958724 (Del. Ch. June 
26, 2015), aff’d, 133 A.3d 971 (Del. 2016). 
 95. In re Citigroup Inc., 964 A.2d at 113. 
 96. Id. at 114, 123, 128. 
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subprime mortgages, and a warning of increasing subprime delinquencies by another 
lender.97  
In the eyes of the Delaware Court of Chancery, however, the warning 
signs “at most . . . evidence[d] that the directors made bad business 
decisions.”98 The alleged “ ‘red flags’ . . . amount[ed] to little more than 
portions of public documents that reflected the worsening conditions 
in the subprime mortgage market and in the economy generally.”99 
Consequently, the court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to plead 
“particularized facts suggesting that the Board was presented with 
‘red flags’ alerting it to potential misconduct.”100 Despite “staggering 
losses” and the understandable “desire to force those responsible to 
account for their wrongdoing,” the court would not engage in judicial 
second-guessing of what it characterized as business decisions, and 
granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to adequately 
plead demand futility.101 
Notably, in 2017, Citigroup directors faced another Caremark 
case, stemming from corporate traumas involving anti–money 
laundering violations, accounts receivable fraud, fraudulent 
manipulation of benchmark foreign exchange rates, and deceptive 
card practices.102 The court noted that the plaintiffs had “produced a 
ponderous omnibus of a complaint,” describing red flags “dating back 
to the financial crisis of a decade ago as well as more recently, in 
connection with activities of Citigroup and its subsidiaries that led to 
large fines levied against the bank.”103 Again finding the complaint 
lacking against Citigroup directors, the court explained: “The 
Complaint makes it reasonably conceivable that the directors, despite 
these red flags, failed to take actions that may have avoided loss to the 
company. That is not the standard, however.”104 In the court’s view, 
although the facts suggested bad results, the plaintiffs had not 
succeeded in implying that bad faith scienter had existed on the part 
of the directors.105 
 
 97. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Corporate Darwinism: Disciplining Managers in a 
World with Weak Shareholder Litigation, 95 N.C. L. REV. 19, 54 (2016). 
 98. In re Citigroup Inc., 964 A.2d at 128. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. (quoting David B. Shaev Profit Sharing Account v. Armstrong, No. CIV.A. 1449-N, 
2006 WL 391931, at *3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 13, 2006)). 
 101. Id. at 126, 131, 139–40. 
 102. Okla. Firefighters Pension & Ret. Sys. v. Corbat, No. 12151-VCG, 2017 WL 6452240, at 
*3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2017). 
 103. Id. at *2. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at *24 (noting “[t]he bad results . . . do not imply bad faith”); see also In re Goldman 
Sachs Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 4826104, at *1, 23–24 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 
2011) (rejecting the possibility that directors would be liable for establishing and not sufficiently 
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Similarly, the ignition switch crisis at General Motors (“GM”) 
did not yield Caremark liability for the directors.106 The company had 
manufactured cars with defective ignition switches that malfunctioned 
during consumer use, leading to a number of serious personal injuries 
and deaths, as well as fines and damages from private lawsuits and 
government investigations.107 Shortly after the company issued the 
first of forty-five recalls, it also disclosed that information about the 
ignition defect had been known to certain engineers and other 
employees within the company for years.108 
GM shareholders brought suit against the directors, alleging 
that the board lacked a process by which it adequately received 
information about safety risks and the risk of punitive damages in 
pending litigation, including National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration inquiries and responses.109  
The court observed the story was “sadly familiar”: “An iconic 
American company produces a product or service that goes terribly 
awry, causing the company financial and reputational damage, and 
perhaps doing damage to society at large as well.”110 Reviewing the 
specific allegations of the complaint, the court explained: “GM had a 
system for reporting risk to the Board, but in the Plaintiffs’ view it 
should have been a better system.”111 Granting the motion to dismiss, 
the court concluded: “Pleadings, even specific pleadings, indicating 
that directors did a poor job of overseeing risk in a poorly-managed 
corporation do not imply director bad faith.”112 So long as some board-
level system exists, and without “red flags” or other bases from which 
the court can infer knowledge on the part of the board that its system 
was inadequate, the complaint will be dismissed.113 
 
overseeing a compensation structure that incentivized “highly risky trading practices”); Daniel 
Hemel & Dorothy S. Lund, Sexual Harassment and Corporate Law, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1583, 
1613–27 (2018) (discussing dismissals in oversight cases involving sexual harassment by high-
profile executives and the potential for such cases to survive motions to dismiss). 
 106. In re Gen. Motors Co. Derivative Litig., No. 9627-VCG, 2015 WL 3958724 (Del. Ch. June 
26, 2015), aff’d, 133 A.3d 971 (Del. 2016). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at *2. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at *1. 
 111. Id. at *14. 
 112. Id. at *17. 
 113. Hill, supra note 13, at 682–83 (“Having no system of controls will yield liability, but 
having an imperfect or even apparently inadequate system generally will not.”); Kimberly D. 
Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 
491 (2003) (“[A] growing body of evidence indicates that internal compliance structures do not 
deter prohibited conduct within firms, and may largely serve a window-dressing function that 
provides both market legitimacy and reduced legal liability.”); Langevoort, supra note 73, at 729–
30 (“It is at least arguable that independent directors do not have the capacity to engage with 
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As these cases demonstrate, as a matter of corporate law, 
courts do not condemn boards for faulty monitoring systems.114 The 
case law is replete with failures to provide information to the board, 
ineffective oversight to make sure compliance violations do not occur, 
and even problematic responses to warning signs that were not well 
calculated to resolve compliance issues.115 Corporate boards must have 
some system and some response, but in corporate law these are 
generally treated as matters of business judgment absent a complete 
dearth of board-level monitoring or egregious facts—seemingly any 
level of business risk is permissible.116 Concerns that boards would not 
be given leeway to exercise discretion concerning their approach to 
internal controls and compliance have not come to fruition;117 instead, 
the opposite concern emerges upon examination—that managerial 
motivations toward business risk and legal compliance are not fully 
aligned with achieving optimal deterrence of social harm.118   
 
this complexity, so that Caremark was wise to demand almost nothing beyond asking that some 
compliance system exists.”). 
 114. Federal and state regulatory enforcement is, of course, another matter and not limited 
to Caremark’s standard. Langevoort, supra note 73, at 732 (“[I]n principle, at least, regulators 
and enforcers who have prosecutorial discretion and the ability to seek compliance-related 
sanction adjustment have no reason to feel beholden to Caremark’s focus on corporate well-being, 
and almost surely do not in fact.”). 
 115. See, e.g., Okla. Firefighters Pension & Ret. Sys. v. Corbat, No. 12151-VCG, 2017 WL 
6452240, at *17 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2017): 
At issue is the duty of loyalty; a board’s efforts can be ineffective, its actions obtuse, 
its results harmful to the corporate weal, without implicating bad faith. Bad faith may 
be inferred where the directors knew or should have known that illegal conduct was 
taking place, yet “took no steps in a good faith effort to prevent or remedy that 
situation.”  
(quoting In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996)) (emphasis 
in original); Horman v. Abney, No. 12290-VCS, 2017 WL 242571, at *11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 2017) 
(“If the members of the board become aware of the red flags and do nothing in response, and 
thereby consciously disregard their fiduciary duties, then they each individually are subject to 
liability for a failure of oversight.”). 
 116. See Langevoort, supra note 73, at 730 (“Caremark was quite clear that these resources 
and deployment choices are matters of business judgment, and hence receive strong deference 
when made in good faith.”). The Delaware Supreme Court has emphasized that a complete 
“dearth of any board-level effort at monitoring” of a significant compliance issue states a claim 
for an oversight failure. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 809 (Del. 2019) (emphasis added). 
 117. See, e.g., Bainbridge et al., supra note 55, at 603–04 (expressing concern that after Stone 
v. Ritter “a conscious decision by the board of directors that the costs of a law compliance 
program outweigh the benefits may no longer be protected by the business judgment rule”). 
 118. See Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Effective Compliance Programs, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE CRIME AND FINANCIAL MISDEALING 247, 254–55 (Jennifer 
Arlen ed., 2018) (arguing that managerial judgment about compliance should be designed to 
penalize firms that underinvest in legal precaution from a social risk perspective even if 
reasonable in terms of expected shareholder value); Langevoort, supra note 73, at 733 (“Suffice it 
to say that managerial motivations toward legal compliance are not fully aligned with either the 
corporation’s best interests or the optimal avoidance of social harm.”); Langevoort, supra note 69, 
at 970–71 (explaining how corporate culture can vary a firm’s risk-return calculus and how this 
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B. The Rare Path of Survival 
From the start, the Caremark court announced that this claim 
was “possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which 
a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”119 This oft-quoted refrain 
about Caremark has created difficulty for Delaware plaintiffs at the 
demand excusal stage, who must demonstrate that a majority of the 
board face a “substantial likelihood” of personal liability.120 
The small handful of Caremark cases that have survived this 
nearly insuperable standard on a motion to dismiss for failure to plead 
demand futility or state a viable claim have all included facts that 
cross a line between business risk and legal risk. Much has been made 
of determining how to analyze cases involving “red flags” and whether 
Caremark itself sets the standard for these cases, as it involved none 
as a factual matter.121 But in practice, the cases reflect that a more 
fundamental sorting is occurring that identifies extreme 
circumstances implicating the issue of obedience, which has resonance 
for the legitimacy of corporate law, as discussed in Part II above. With 
limited exception,122 these cases involve either an utter and absolute 
 
may diverge from society’s optimal precaution point); Partnoy, supra note 74, at 419 (“In general, 
oversight based on future expected costs from the regulatory and tort regimes is unlikely to lead 
corporations to internalize social costs in an optimal way. Agency costs can lead corporations not 
to internalize the difference between social costs and private costs.”). 
 119. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967. 
 120. See Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 934 (Del. 1993) (“[A] court must determine 
whether or not the particularized factual allegations of a derivative stockholder complaint create 
a reasonable doubt that, as of the time the complaint is filed, the board of directors could have 
properly exercised its independent and disinterested business judgment in responding to a 
demand.”); see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 (Del. 1984) (stating “substantial 
likelihood” aspect of demand futility standard), overruled on other grounds, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 
A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000). 
 121. See, e.g., Gadinis & Miazad, supra note 84, at 2169–77 (examining whether a board has 
discharged its monitoring obligation in terms of red flags reaching the board and prompting a 
response); Paul Graf, Red Flags in the Morning, Directors Take Warning . . . , 6 BUS. L. BRIEF 19, 
19 (2010) (exploring how “[t]he knowledge requirement hinges on what information or signals, 
‘red flags,’ come to the board’s attention”); Langevoort, supra note 73, at 735 (“[T]he moment the 
board is brought into the compliance risk discussion, liability exposure increases to at least a 
small extent, and Caremark itself no longer sets the applicable standard.”); Eric J. Pan, 
Rethinking the Board’s Duty to Monitor: A Critical Assessment of the Delaware Doctrine, 38 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 209, 210 (2011) (criticizing “the Delaware doctrine of the duty to monitor” on 
various grounds, including that “the doctrine incentivizes directors to avoid asking questions or 
otherwise making efforts to uncover possible red flags”). 
 122. A small number of cases involved allegations of accounting improprieties or complicity 
in self-dealing. See Stewart v. Wilmington Tr. SP Servs., Inc., 112 A.3d 271, 281, 301 (Del. Ch. 
2015) (denying a motion to dismiss from a “resident” director who “allegedly went along without 
raising a peep” with a “fraudulent scheme year after year”); Saito v. McCall, No. CIV.A. 17132-
NC, 2004 WL 3029876, at *1, *7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2004) (denying a motion to dismiss regarding 
an oversight claim that directors “presided over a fraudulent accounting scheme”), overruled on 
other grounds, Lambrecht v. O’Neal, 3 A.3d 277 (Del. 2010); see also ATR-Kim Eng Fin. Corp. v. 
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failure to put any board-level monitoring in place for an “intrinsically 
critical” compliance issue, such as in Marchand,123 or a board that 
improperly ignored or managed legal risk, such as in the cases 
discussed below.124 
To start with a contrast to the Citigroup case from the financial 
crisis era, which involved massive amounts of business risk and a 
typical result of dismissal, a different case from this time involving the 
insurance giant AIG survived a motion to dismiss with allegations of 
disobedience.125 The AIG plaintiffs alleged that the directors had 
engaged in transactions designed to hide AIG’s true financial 
situation, sold illegal financial products, rigged markets, and illegally 
avoided taxes. Denying a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the chancery 
court explained: “The Complaint fairly supports the assertion that 
AIG’s Inner Circle led a—and I use this term with knowledge of its 
strength—criminal organization. The diversity, pervasiveness, and 
materiality of the alleged financial wrongdoing at AIG is 
extraordinary.”126 Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
plaintiffs, the court found that “given the pervasiveness of the fraud, 
[the defendants] knew that AIG was engaging in illegal conduct.”127 
Shareholders similarly pleading pervasive and widespread 
fraud also succeeded past motions to dismiss in two cases that arose in 
2013 involving Chinese corporations that had accessed the U.S. public 
markets through reverse mergers—China Agritech and Fuqi. In 
China Agritech, according to the plaintiffs’ allegations, rampant 
misconduct was occurring at the company, including the failure to use 
proceeds from a securities offering for its stated purpose and “repeated 
 
Araneta, No. CIV.A. 489-N, 2006 WL 3783520, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2006) (denying a motion 
to dismiss from two directors who acted with “complicity” and as “stooges” for a controlling 
shareholder-board chair who engaged in self-dealing). Other noteworthy cases involve litigation 
for corporate books and records to investigate potential oversight claims. See In re Facebook, Inc. 
Section 220 Litig., No. 2018-0661-JRS, 2019 WL 2320842, at *8 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2019) (seeking 
books and records to investigate potential wrongdoing in the “implementation of a business 
model” that violated a FTC consent decree); Melzer v. CNET Networks, Inc., 934 A.2d 912, 913 
(Del. Ch. 2007) (seeking inspection of books and records relating to stock option backdating). 
 123. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 822 (Del. 2019). 
 124. This argument builds on an earlier observation by Professors Cox and Thomas. See Cox 
& Thomas, supra note 97, at 55–56: 
Indeed, the division between Massey and Citigroup may be that Citigroup involved a 
challenge to legitimate business practices, whereas Massey is riveted, as was 
Caremark, on the directors’ conscious disregard of the corporation’s adherence with 
the law when implementing business strategies . . . . [T]he facts required to satisfy 
even Massey reflect such an abandonment of the directors’ monitoring role as to 
suggest outright complicity in the lawless acts rather than a want of oversight. 
 125. See In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 965 A.2d 763, 779 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 126. Id. at 799. 
 127. Id. at 782. 
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failures to maintain effective internal controls” that ultimately 
resulted in delisting from the public exchange.128 Similarly, in Fuqi, 
the plaintiffs asserted particularized allegations that “the directors 
did nothing to ensure that its reporting mechanisms were accurate” 
and “the board knew that it had problems with its accounting and 
inventory processes” because it announced a financial restatement.129 
After the plaintiff made demand to the board to remedy claimed 
breaches of fiduciary duty and improve its internal controls, the board 
failed to respond for two years.130 During this time, the directors 
allowed $130 million to be transferred out of the company.131 Based on 
Fuqi’s self-disclosed accounting inadequacies, the court concluded that 
Fuqi “had no meaningful controls in place. The board of directors may 
have had regular meetings, and an Audit Committee may have 
existed, but there does not seem to have been any regulation of the 
company’s operations in China.”132 
In total, in both cases the court concluded that the plaintiffs 
had pled facts that, when assumed true, were sufficient to infer that 
the directors knew that the internal controls were inadequate and had 
failed to correct the deficiencies. More generally, the picture that 
emerges from the pleadings is of pervasive fraud and that the boards 
facilitated, or were complicit, in this wrongdoing.  
Three other Delaware cases also succeeded in surviving 
motions to dismiss and suggest the directors participated, at some 
level, in disobedience: In re Massey Energy Co.; Louisiana Municipal 
Police Employees’ Retirement System v. Pyott; and In re Clovis 
Oncology, Inc. As the number of cases surviving the motion to dismiss 
is exceedingly thin, it is worth examining each in turn. 
Massey involved “a coal mining corporation . . . [c]onvinced that 
it knew better than the public authorities charged with enforcing laws 
designed to make mining a safer and cleaner business.”133 Tragedy 
struck amid this company culture of lax safety precautions: an 
explosion occurred at one of the company’s mines in West Virginia, 
resulting in the death of twenty-nine miners.134 This tragedy “was not 
 
 128. In re China Agritech, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., No. 7163-VCL, 2013 WL 2181514, 
at *18 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2013). 
 129. Rich ex rel. Fuqi Int’l., Inc. v. Yu Kwai Chong, 66 A.3d 963, 983–84 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 983. The court further noted: “[E]ven if I were to find that Fuqi had some system 
of internal controls in place, I may infer that the board’s failure to monitor that system was a 
breach of fiduciary duty.” Id. 
 133. In re Massey Energy Co. Derivative & Class Action Litig., No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL 
2176479, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011). 
 134. Id. 
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the first time that Massey miners had suffered death and serious 
injuries.”135 The company “had pled guilty to criminal charges, had 
suffered other serious judgments and settlements as a result of 
violations of law, had been caught trying to hide violations of law and 
suppress material evidence, and had miners suffer death and serious 
injuries at its facilities.”136 Shareholder litigation followed, alleging 
that the Massey directors did not make a good faith effort to ensure 
that the company complied with its legal obligations.137 
On a procedural posture seeking a preliminary injunction 
against a merger, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had likely 
pled a Caremark claim that would survive a motion to dismiss, even 
under the heightened pleading standard applicable under Rule 23.1.138 
Crucial to this finding were extensive factual allegations suggesting 
that the Massey directors had knowingly caused the company to seek 
profit by violating the law.139 According to the detailed pleading, the 
company culture involved a CEO and other top managers that 
knowingly flouted applicable miner safety laws, took an openly 
aggressive attitude against the relevant agency, made cost-cutting 
decisions to put miners at risk, publicly suggested that they knew 
mine safety better than the regulators, and “often argued with the law 
itself.”140 The directors were allegedly under the domination of this 
management and had participated in “foster[ing] a business strategy 
expressly designed to put coal production and higher profits over 
compliance with the law.”141 Accordingly, the court concluded that the 
plaintiffs had successfully pled “particularized facts creating an 
inference that the Board and management were aware of a troubling 
continuing pattern of non-compliance in fact and of a managerial 
attitude suggestive of a desire to fight with and hide evidence from the 
company’s regulators.”142 Again, as in the China Agritech and Fuqi 
cases, Massey was not a straightforward case of failed business 
oversight, but rather one that suggested something more—that the 
directors had engaged in disobedience. 
Pyott presents another example fitting this pattern. In that 
case, plaintiff-shareholders brought a Caremark claim against the 
Allergan board for failing to prevent the company’s violations of the 
 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at *20. 
137. Id. 
 138. Id. at *21. 
 139. Id. at *20. 
 140. Id. at *19–21. 
 141. Id. at *19. 
 142. Id. at *21. 
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ban on off-label drug marketing.143 Doctors can legally prescribe a 
drug such as Botox for an off-label therapeutic use that is not FDA 
approved, but it is illegal for a manufacturer to market a drug for such 
off-label use.144 Allergan’s annual report reflected an understanding of 
“the critical distinction between off-label sales and marketing,”145 and 
its general counsel advised the board about an FDA inquiry and 
incident that indicated the company had likely engaged in illegal 
conduct in its marketing practices.146 Despite this warning, “the Board 
discussed and approved a series of annual strategic plans that 
contemplated expanding Botox sales dramatically within geographic 
areas that encompassed the United States” and those “plans 
contemplated new markets for Botox that involved applications that 
were off-label uses in the United States.”147 Allergan eventually 
entered into a settlement with the U.S. Department of Justice 
pursuant to which Allergan pled guilty to criminal misdemeanor 
misbranding and paid a total of $600 million in civil and criminal 
fines.148 
Denying the motion to dismiss, Vice Chancellor Travis Laster 
remarked, “It is not unreasonable to infer that the Board and CEO 
saw the distinction between off-label selling and off-label marketing as 
a source of legal risk to be managed, rather than a boundary to be 
avoided.”149 The complaint set out detailed factual allegations that 
“the CEO and his management team devised, and the Board approved, 
a business plan that relied on off-label-use-promoting activities, 
confident that the risk of regulatory detection was low, that most 
regulatory problems could be solved, and that dealing with regulatory 
risk was a cost of doing business.”150 Pyott thus involved more than an 
allegation of conscious disregard for duties—rather, it implicated a 
direct connection between the board and a business plan premised on 
illegal activity.151 
 
 143. La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 316 (Del. Ch. 2012), overruled on 
other grounds, 74 A.3d 612 (Del. 2013). 
 144. Id. at 317–18. 
 145. Id. at 318. 
 146. Id. at 320. 
 147. Id. at 352. 
 148. Id. at 316. 
 149. Id. at 355. 
 150. Id. at 356. 
 151. See Melbourne Mun. Firefighters’ Pension Tr. Fund v. Jacobs, No. 10872-VCMR, 2016 
WL 4076369, at *12 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 2016) (“[T]he board’s alleged bad faith in Pyott was not 
based on its conscious disregard for its duty to prevent the company from engaging in illegal 
conduct. Instead it was based on the board’s alleged decision to cause the company to engage in 
illegal conduct.”); see also In re Facebook, Inc. Section 220 Litig., No. 2018-0661-JRS, 2019 WL 
2320842, at *8 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2019) (granting plaintiffs’ request for books and records to 
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Finally, the plaintiffs in Clovis Oncology pled with particularity 
a Caremark claim alleging that the directors of a biopharmaceutical 
company “did nothing” after repeatedly receiving signals from 
management that the company was violating the FDA’s clinical trial 
protocol for its most promising drug under review.152 These protocols 
and related FDA regulations were “mission critical regulatory issues” 
for the company, which had no drugs on the market, and the 
defendants “viewed detailed information” regarding the clinical trial 
at each board meeting.153 Although less egregious than some cases 
that have survived a motion to dismiss, the Clovis Oncology pleadings 
nonetheless fit the pattern described of a board that allegedly 
facilitated, or was complicit, in wrongdoing. 
Most problematic was the plaintiff’s allegation that the board 
knowingly ignored “that the Company was violating—perhaps 
consciously violating—the [clinical trial] protocol and then misleading 
the market and regulators” about the company’s “mission critical 
product.”154 In the face of management’s revelation that it was 
improperly calculating drug trial success, the board, “comprised of 
experts,” had allegedly “allowed the Company to deceive regulators 
and the market regarding the drug’s efficacy.”155  
In all these cases, plaintiff–shareholders survived motions to 
dismiss with detailed factual allegations that suggested defendant 
directors not only ignored red flags, but had gone farther down a path 
of participation or complicity in wrongdoing. Caremark claims in these 
cases resemble allegations of disobedience—facts supporting an 
inference that directors knew or should have known the corporation 
was engaged in legal risk or illegality. 
In the recent case involving Duke Energy before the Delaware 
Supreme Court,156 a divergence of opinion on the application of this 
principle explains the filing of majority and dissenting opinions. In 
this case, the country’s largest electricity producer suffered a ruptured 
pipe that sent coal ash and toxic wastewater into the Dan River. It led 
the company to plead guilty to nine misdemeanor criminal violations 
of the Federal Clean Water Act and to pay a fine exceeding $100 
 
investigate potential wrongdoing by the Facebook directors and top executives in 
“implement[ing] a business model that exposed private user data to unauthorized third-party 
access” in violation of a FTC consent decree). 
 152. In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., No. 2017-0222, 2019 WL 4850188, at *6 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019). 
 153. Id. at *13. 
 154. Id. at *10, *14.  
 155. Id. at *1, *6, *14. 
 156. City of Birmingham Ret. & Relief Sys. v. Good, 177 A.3d 47, 65 (Del. 2017). 
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million. The majority saw the case as fitting the typical pattern 
appropriate for dismissal, in which plaintiffs “conflate the bad 
outcome of the criminal proceedings with the actions of the board.”157 
It interpreted management presentations to the board on the status of 
environmental problems as evidence that the board had taken some 
action to address regulatory concerns, concluding that the board 
therefore had not consciously disregarded its oversight 
responsibility.158 Chief Justice Leo E. Strine, Jr. dissented, finding 
that the facts raised a pleading stage inference that “it was the 
business strategy of Duke Energy, accepted and supported by its 
board of directors, to run the company in a manner that purposely 
skirted, and in many ways consciously violated, important 
environmental laws.”159 
Chief Justice Strine acknowledged that the differing views on 
the court with regard to the Caremark claim resulted from whether 
the facts were interpreted as legal disobedience: 
Sadly, my dissent rests on my reluctant conclusion that the facts as pled support a fair 
inference that the board was all too aware that Duke’s business strategy involved 
flouting important laws, while employing a strategy of political influence-seeking and 
cajolement to reduce the risk that the company would be called to fair account. Under 
the facts as pled, the only surprising thing about the Dan River spill that gave rise to 
the state regulator’s issuance of a $6.8 million fine, twenty-three Notice of Violation 
letters, twenty-six Notice of Deficiency letters, and a finding that Duke committed more 
than 760 daily violations of environmental regulations, in addition to other severe civil 
and criminal penalties related to Duke’s operations at other sites, is that something like 
it did not happen years earlier.160 
The pleadings of extensive legal violations over a significant 
period of time, combined with evidence that the corporation cultivated 
lax oversight from the state regulator and helped to elect a governor 
who had spent decades as a Duke Energy employee, supported an 
inference that the board was aware the corporation was not on a path 
toward legal compliance. Although the management made 
presentations to the board on the status of environmental problems, 
the broader set of facts puts the case in line with other narratives of 
disobedience and underscores the rare path of survival for Caremark 
claims in Delaware. 
 
 157. Id. at 59. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 65 (Strine, C.J., dissenting). 
 160. Id. at 68. 
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C. Implications and Future Directions 
Drawing together these threads of discussion on the role of 
good faith and the doctrinal convergence of Caremark and 
disobedience, two additional observations emerge. 
First, Caremark case law has been shaped by an emphasis on 
the line between business risk and legal risk. We can understand this 
distinction in light of corporate law’s aim to further legal obedience 
and its own legitimacy. It is not, however, a distinction based on an 
evaluation of the merits of the underlying business activity, and it 
ultimately informs what we can expect of the doctrine.161 
The approach taken in the case law suggests, for example, that 
a distinction might be drawn between a financial institution that 
takes massive amounts of business risk—which would not give rise to 
oversight liability—and an innovative startup that knowingly flouts 
laws—which could potentially result in liability.162 Notably, the social 
value or harm created by each of these activities—for shareholders 
and stakeholders—is arguable and context specific,163 but corporate 
 
 161. See Asbestos Workers Local 42 Pension Fund v. Bammann, No. 9772-VCG, 2015 WL 
2455469, at *14 (Del. Ch. May 22, 2015) (“It is not entirely clear under what circumstances a 
stockholder derivative plaintiff can prevail against the directors on a theory of oversight liability 
for failure to monitor business risk under Delaware law; the Plaintiff cites no examples where 
such an action has successfully been maintained.”); In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. S’holder 
Litig., No. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 4826104, at *21 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011) (“As a preliminary 
matter, this Court has not definitively stated whether a board’s Caremark duties include a duty 
to monitor business risk.”); see also Okla. Firefighters Pension & Ret. Sys. v. Corbat, No. 12151-
VCG, 2017 WL 6452240, at 18* (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2017):  
Banamex made a risky business decision that turned out poorly for the company. That 
suggests a failure to monitor or properly limit business risk, a theory of director 
liability that this Court has never definitively accepted. Indeed, evaluation of risk is a 
core function of the exercise of business judgment;  
Reiter ex rel. Capital One Fin. Corp. v. Fairbank, No. 11693-CB, 2016 WL 6081823, at *8 (Del. 
Ch. Oct. 18, 2016) (“In applying the Caremark theory of liability, even in the face of alleged red 
flags, this Court has been careful to distinguish between failing to fulfill one’s oversight 
obligations with respect to fraudulent or criminal conduct as opposed to monitoring the business 
risk of the enterprise.”); In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 131 (Del. 
Ch. 2009) (“There are significant differences between failing to oversee employee fraudulent or 
criminal conduct and failing to recognize the extent of a Company’s business risk.”). 
 162. The recent Caremark case involving the founder and directors of ride-hailing company 
Uber is instructive. The Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed the suit because the inaction at 
issue was not connected to the alleged corporate culture of lawbreaking—the legal violations and 
monitoring at issue did not concern a “single topic” as the mining law violations had in Massey. 
See McElrath v. Kalanick, No. 2017-0888-SG, 2019 WL 1430210, at *13 (Del. Ch. April 1, 2019). 
The case might have come out differently if the pleadings had, for example, concerned the 
conscious disregard of pervasive taxi law violations instead of Uber’s acquisition of Otto, which 
led to a lawsuit by Google for misappropriation of intellectual property. 
 163. See, e.g., Pollman, supra note 14, at 731–32 (noting the potential for social value in 
some activity that pushes or transgresses legal boundaries); see also Langevoort, supra note 69, 
at 936 (noting that psychologists have found experimental evidence linking cognitive creativity 
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law does not enter that debate. Corporate law instead seeks to 
preserve the legitimacy of broad business discretion by setting 
minimal process thresholds for compliance and otherwise drawing a 
strict prohibition against the conscious or intentional managing of risk 
of legal enforcement. 
As a consequence, absent a dramatic shift in approach, the 
oversight doctrine is not an effective tool for holding fiduciaries 
accountable for failures to monitor business risk.164 Furthermore, as 
corporate law does not evaluate the merits of external laws or provide 
exceptions to the obligation of legal obedience, the Caremark doctrine 
could be problematic for fiduciaries of innovative companies that 
bump up against regulations.165 Oversight liability may be unlikely in 
light of the obstacles involved in derivative litigation, the lack of 
incentive for shareholders to bring suit if the company breaks laws in 
pursuit of profit, and the potential defense that it was unclear how 
existing laws would apply to an innovative product or service and thus 
there was no conscious disregard or intent.166 Nonetheless, it is 
notable that corporate law disfavors businesses that engage in legal 
risk. 
Second, examining the Delaware case law reveals that two 
separate doctrines have evolved within the duty of good faith—
obedience and oversight. In practice to date, the Caremark oversight 
obligation has been cabined to extreme cases involving legal 
violations, such as in cases of utter failure to engage in critical board-
level oversight of legal compliance, allegedly pervasive wrongdoing, 
complicity in fraudulent or illegal business models and practices, 
misleading regulators, and repeat offenders. Corporate law’s 
commitment to the rule of law certainly supports oversight 
accountability in these instances of utter failure and disobedience.167 
 
and unethical behavior, thus leading to “the conundrum that the origins of noncompliance may 
be found in seemingly benign—even prized—behaviors, traits and cultural artifacts that are 
thought to generate success in a hyper-competitive marketplace”). 
 164. For this reason, defendants might also attempt to characterize their monitoring activity 
as related to business risk and to otherwise show that they acted in good faith. For an argument 
that some cases are “blended” insofar as they involve a legal violation but the damages sought 
also include losses caused by bad business oversight, see Ezra Wasserman Mitchell, Caremark’s 
Hidden Promise, 51 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 239, 256–64 (2018). 
 165. See Elizabeth Pollman, The Rise of Regulatory Affairs in Innovative Startups, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (D. Gordon Smith, Christine 
Hurt & Brian Broughman eds., forthcoming 2020) (identifying developments contributing to the 
rise of regulatory affairs in innovative startups).   
 166. Pollman, supra note 14, at 750–57. 
 167. Some corporations that engage in activity that pushes the boundaries of lawfulness may 
succeed in gaining popular support and even changing or clarifying the law, which may in turn 
be relevant to the analysis from a corporate law perspective. The cases discussed in Section III.B, 
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Moreover, corporate law’s commitment to the rule of law 
supports a more robust application of oversight duties. The Delaware 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Marchand signals a willingness to 
recognize pleadings of an utter failure to establish a board-level 
monitoring system as required under the first prong of Caremark. 
Regarding the second prong, this Article’s analysis suggests that the 
Caremark standard need not be applied so stringently as to require 
disobedience bordering on outright complicity or knowing misconduct. 
The stated standard of conscious disregard is amply capacious to also 
capture fiduciaries acting with willful ignorance or an awareness that 
their efforts at compliance are insufficient. The relevant inquiry is not 
the effectiveness of the system of compliance and monitoring, as such, 
but rather whether the fiduciary acted in good faith in actively 
attempting to carry out these obligations with the aim of full legal 
compliance. A stronger approach is possible and would further the 
public-regarding purpose of the good faith obligation and affirm that 
oversight liability can stem from conduct that falls short of an intent 
to violate law, which has been recognized as a separate basis for 
liability. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has explored the legitimizing role of the duty of 
good faith in corporate law and the doctrinal convergence of oversight 
and disobedience. Corporate law acknowledges societal interests in the 
rule of law and embeds a safety valve for public policy in the 
obligations of fiduciaries that cannot be eliminated. The corporate law 
requirements of legal obedience and oversight preserve the ability for 
courts to flexibly respond to violations of public trust and provide 
legitimacy for the larger enterprise of state-chartered corporations. 
Examining the Caremark doctrine on oversight responsibility, 
however, reveals that in practice the potential for accountability 
through fiduciary law has been narrowly circumscribed. With limited 
exception, the small handful of oversight cases decided by Delaware 
courts that have survived motions to dismiss involved pleadings of 
either a complete lack of board-level oversight or egregious 
disobedience such as allegations that a corporation was engaged in 
pervasive wrongdoing or directors were complicit in fraudulent 
business models or practices. Furthermore, in case law to date, 
Delaware courts have prioritized giving directors broad latitude to 
 
however, do not fit this characterization and instead reflect legal violations with little to no 
potential for social value or legal change or clarification. 
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take business risk by drawing a line at legal risk, despite the 
possibility that both types of activity could create social value or harm 
depending on the circumstances. Bringing together these 
observations, this Article’s analysis concludes that corporate law’s 
public-regarding commitment to the rule of law supports 
accountability in these instances as well as applying a more robust 
understanding of the obligations of oversight and obedience. 
   
 
